An Enterprise Rights Management System for On-the-Field Maintenance Facilities

Luigi Catuogno,Daniel Riccio,Clemente Galdi

doi:10.1109/access.2020.2995564

Abstract

On-the-field maintenance of complex equipments, that may involve multiple subjects and stakeholders, is one of most challenging scenarios for Enterprise Rights Management (ERM). In this paper, we present an ERM system that guarantees the “on-site” protection of information confidentiality. In particular, our system features local data encryption and minimal data transfers. A secure key management protocol is executed by the devices operating on-site and the remote manufacturer's support center and guarantees an efficient and dynamic enforcement of arbitrary data-provider-defined access policies. Operator identities are verified by means of strong multi-biometric verification schemes whilst protecting their biometries by means of cancelable biometries. To this end, we provide the first experimental evaluation of cancelable biometrics based on the fusion of face and voice biometries, that may be of independent interest.

Highlights

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) constitute a key enabler in innovation for the current economy
We provide the first experimental evaluation of cancelable biometrics based on the fusion of face and voice biometries
Our proposal fully exploit off-the-shelves cameras and microphones, currently available on commercial devices, for face and voice recognition. Each operator stores her own biometric data, in a standard X.509v3 certificate, along with her own public/private key pair on a her own device, which we refer to the User Device (UD)

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) constitute a key enabler in innovation for the current economy. Our proposal fully exploit off-the-shelves cameras and microphones, currently available on commercial devices, for face and voice recognition Each operator stores her own biometric data, in a standard X.509v3 certificate, along with her own public/private key pair on a her own device, which we refer to the User Device (UD). The goal of the attack is to get access to the information stored on the CD in a given context without having the required authorization This type of adversary can (a) legitimately authenticate using their own biometric credentials and measurements and (b) can monitor and store the content of unprotected memory and storage components of CD and UD.

CANCELABLE BIOMETRICS USING FACE AND VOICE

SYSTEM OPERATION

CONCLUSION