Abstract

Differential power analysis attacks are the most commonly used means to break cryptographic devices within the side-channel attack technology. Since there is a lot of noise in the energy trace of cryptographic devices, a large number of energy traces are needed to carry out the attack, resulting in a high computational cost. To solve this problem, this study starts with an analysis of the characteristics of power waveform formation from the inherent properties of the complementary metal oxide semiconductor circuit. Then, based on the Hamming distance classification method and the results of power waveform analysis, the useful information interval in the energy trace is located, that is, the interval with a strong correlation with the key. Thus, we achieve energy trace compression. Finally, a system on chip with a 128-bit AES algorithm is used to conduct various attack experiments in the effective interval. The results show that the calculation is cut off by 96%, which greatly reduces the computational cost for differential power analysis attacks.

Highlights

  • Cryptographic devices inevitably leak some physical information, such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and runtime, when performing encryption or encryption operations

  • This study proposes a method for locating marker points based on the Hamming distance, which accurately locates the position of power consumption data in the energy trace that has the strongest correlation with the key

  • Based on the current consumption characteristics of complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) circuits, this study discusses the location and range of the critical data needed for Differential power analysis (DPA) attacks

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Cryptographic devices inevitably leak some physical information, such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and runtime, when performing encryption or encryption operations. Power analysis attacks [2] use the energy consumption characteristics of cryptographic devices rather than the mathematical characteristics of cryptographic algorithms. In order to improve the success rate and efficiency of DPA attacks, it is important to pre-process the power traces. This has two main purposes: one is to reduce the power consumption samples and the other is to decrease the sample calculation. This study proposes a method for locating marker points based on the Hamming distance, which accurately locates the position of power consumption data in the energy trace that has the strongest correlation with the key. Where E is the energy consumed by the circuit during the register switching from v0 state to v1 state, a is the energy consumption ratio coefficient, and b is the power consumption and noise that are not related to the processed data

STEPS OF DPA ATTACK BASED ON THE MEAN DIFFERENCE
ENERGY TRACE COMPRESSION
ATTACK SUCCESS RATE AND RELIABILITY
ENERGY TRACE MARKER LOCATION
Findings
CONCLUSIONS
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