Abstract
i. This paper is concerned with a version of the Dream Argument of Descartes' First and Sixth Meditations. Most philosophers have assumed that because such sceptical arguments are intended to question whether empirical observation can justify beliefs about physical objects, it would be illegitimate to appeal to empirically supported beliefs in reply. Our contention is that, contrary to this assumption, the Cartesian argument is susceptible to empirical refutation.
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