Abstract
Suspense realism claims suspense is itself a genuine, distinct emotion. While current theories of suspense are suspense realist theories, I argue for a suspense eliminativist theory according to which suspense is not itself a genuine, distinct emotion but a subspecies of an emotion, or the class comprising all and only those subspecies, chiefly demarcated by the necessity of uncertainty and primarily the province of (primarily fictional) narrative encounters. There are several prima facie compelling reasons to think suspense eliminativism is capable of grounding a theory equally if not better able to resolve the principal concerns suspense theory must address.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
