Abstract

Recently, homomorphic message authentication code (MAC) schemes have been proposed to resist against pollution attacks in network coding. However, existing methods face a common challenge: the generated MAC t belongs to a small finite field F <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">q</sub> , which means that an adversary could attack by randomly guessing the value of t, and succeed with probability 1/q. Since q is a predetermined system parameter which is typically set as 2 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">8</sup> , the resulted security 1/256 could be unsatisfactory in practice. In this paper, we propose an efficient homomorphic MAC for authentication in network coding. The proposed method achieves a reliable security parameter 1/q <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">l</sup> using only one key, where l could be chosen according to different security requirements. Compared with previous approaches that using multiple tags, the proposed homomorphic MAC has both low computation and communication overheads.

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