An economic theory of a hybrid (competitive authoritarian or illiberal) regime

Abstract

Recently, not only has dictatorship resurfaced, but a new form of government has appeared that is neither democratic nor dictatorial. There are various names for this new form: “competitive—authoritarian”, “illiberal democracy”, or simply “hybrid”. Some obvious examples are Hungary, Poland and Turkey. Some connect the origin of hybrids in modern times to the rise of populism. Populism is connected to the illiberal or hybrid idea in that populists tend to repress minorities as a way of appealing to the majority. Authoritarian populists typically divide the population into “us” versus “them”. This paper develops a model of how a hybrid can arise from democracy. I introduce a “strongman or strongwoman” as a leader who can implement repression and gain power. I develop a simple model of a “hybrid” regime in which repression is less than that under dictatorship but greater than that under liberal democracy. The hybrid regime is a special case of Wintrobe’s general theory of dictatorship, but it goes further than that by endogenizing equilibrium extremism of the regime as well as repression. I show how the hybrid regime reacts to exogenous shocks, and develop optimal policy for other countries and institutions interested in reducing repression (the UN, US or EU) towards hybrids.