Abstract
Efforts to formulate the economic behavior of OPEC are complicated because the coalition is made up of member countries, each of which pursues a different objective, arrives at its own optimum price and quantity, and has an opportunity to participate in a group consensus. This requires a new cartel model that will explain the coalitionary process, yet remain flexible enough to consider the diverse objectives of individual members. The author analyzes the possibility of realizing this consensus in relation to the differing politico-economic structures of the members. He concludes that the long-run stability of OPEC requires reversing some historical patterns, although offsetting effects may avoid a short-term instability. 19 references, 3 figures, 2 tables.
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