Abstract
The explanations of turnover in legislatures developed by political scientists are combined with an economic cartel model of the organization of legislatures to explain interstate variation in turnover in the period 1972-1986. Few robustly significant determinants are found and the results question the applicability of the theory of industrial organization to this area of political organization.
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