Abstract
The explosive growth of traffic demand challenges the current cellular network. Device-to-Device assisted offloading is a promising solution for alleviating traffic overloading burdens. However, a content transmitter (CT) unwillingly participates in cellular offloading due to the selfish nature and non-cooperation. To this end, an incentive mechanism initiated by mobile users (MUs) is proposed to motivate the CT’s participation for maximizing the CT’s profit and mobile users’ utilities. In particular, we consider the utility of a mobile user by jointly combining effects of social awareness and network congestion. The MUs and content providers offer proper economic payments to compensate the CT’s energy consumption cost. The interactions among participants formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game. The main aim of this game is to reach Nash equilibrium (NE) that neither the CT nor MUs have incentives to deviate unilaterally. We theoretically prove the existence and uniqueness of NE. Furthermore, iterative algorithms are designed to calculate NE for obtaining the best strategies of the CT and MUs. Numerical results demonstrate the robustness and feasibility of our proposed model.
Highlights
With the rapid development of mobile devices such as smartphones, people can communicate socially anytime, anywhere
We model the interactions between a set of Mobile users (MUs) and the content transmitter (CT) as a two-stage Stackelberg game by jointly considering MUs’ social awareness, cellular network’s congestion and content provider (CP)’s economic support
We theoretically prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE), which indicates that mobile users have their best response strategies and the CT has the optimal pricing
Summary
With the rapid development of mobile devices such as smartphones, people can communicate socially anytime, anywhere. Mobile users can share contents through D2D communication instead of cellular network. The operator utilizes MUs’ social network to increase the opportunity of data transmission and achieve the purpose of offloading more requested data [12], [13]. We propose an economic incentive mechanism to improve the CT’s participation in data transmission. We propose a distributed pricing framework to compensate the CT’s cost with economic supports of the content provider (CP) and mobile users. We model the interactions between a set of MUs and the CT as a two-stage Stackelberg game by jointly considering MUs’ social awareness, cellular network’s congestion and CP’s economic support. The CT and MUs only exchange the strategy information at the expense of a small communication overhead.
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