An Economic Examination of the Post-Transition Fertility Decline in Russia

Abstract

This article uses longitudinal household data to examine the decline in the Total Fertility Rate in Russia from 2.0 in 1989 to 1.3 in 2001. Using individual and community-level panel data spanning the 1994–2001 era, the decline in household income can account for about a 28% decline in yearly birth propensities amongst married couples. The relationship between educational attainment and fertility appears to have changed markedly in the post-Soviet era. More educated individuals now have greater propensities to bear children than their vocationally educated counterparts within marriage. Female labour force participation is not strongly associated with fertility decisions of married women in the post-Soviet era, and local provisions for children also do not have important effects. These results suggest that improving real family incomes will be more important in raising fertility rates than improving child benefits levels or increasing community childcare provisions.