Abstract
We add a new predicate T to the language of Peano Arithmetic, with T( x) intended to mean ‘ x is the Gödel number of a true sentence of the augmented language’. We create a list of plausible axioms and rules of inference concerning this predicate T, each of which embodies some aspect of its intended interpretation as truth. We classify all subsets of the list as either consistent or inconsistent, and we measure the proof-theoretic strength of several subsets by comparing them with familiar systems of arithmetic and analysis.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
