Abstract

A tension between cooperation and conflict characterizes the behavioral dynamics of many social species. The foraging benefits of group living include increased efficiency and reduced need for vigilance, but social foraging can also encourage theft of captured prey from conspecifics. The payoffs of stealing prey from others (scrounging) versus capturing prey (producing) may depend not only on the frequency of each foraging strategy in the group but also on an individual’s ability to steal. By observing the foraging behavior of juvenile coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch), we found that, within a group, relatively smaller coho acted primarily as producers and took longer to handle prey, and were therefore more likely to be targeted by scroungers than relatively larger coho. Further, our observations suggest that the frequency of scrounging may be higher when groups contained individuals of different sizes. Based on these observations, we developed a model of phenotype-limited producer-scrounger dynamics, in which rates of stealing were structured by the relative size of producers and scroungers within the foraging group. Model simulations show that when the success of stealing is positively related to body size, relatively large predators should tend to be scroungers while smaller predators should be producers. Contrary to previous models, we also found that, under certain conditions, producer and scrounger strategies could coexist for both large and small phenotypes. Large scroungers tended to receive the highest payoff, suggesting that producer-scrounger dynamics may result in an uneven distribution of benefits among group members that—under the right conditions—could entrench social positions of dominance.

Highlights

  • Group living has many potential benefits, including reduced predation risk and increased foraging success (Evans et al 2015), but natural selection can produce cheaters that parasitize other group members (Nowak 2006)

  • If producing and scrounging are mutually exclusive strategies such that individuals can only act as a producer or a scrounger at any given moment, producer-scrounger dynamics can be modeled as an alternative-option game (Vickery et al 1991; Barta and Giraldeau 1998)

  • We developed a game-theoretic producer-scrounger model that builds on previous models, with explicit consideration of how phenotypic differences influence the rate of successful theft from other group members

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Summary

Introduction

Group living has many potential benefits, including reduced predation risk and increased foraging success (Evans et al 2015), but natural selection can produce cheaters that parasitize other group members (Nowak 2006). Theor Ecol (2018) 11:417–431 simultaneously looking for scrounging opportunities and Bjoin in^ when food is found by any individual in the group This is known as the information-sharing model of kleptoparasitism, and in this case, scrounging does not affect the overall foraging success of the group. If producing and scrounging are mutually exclusive strategies such that individuals can only act as a producer or a scrounger at any given moment, producer-scrounger dynamics can be modeled as an alternative-option game (Vickery et al 1991; Barta and Giraldeau 1998) In this case, individuals acting as scroungers cannot bring new prey into the group, and, overall group foraging success invariably declines with an increase in the proportion of scroungers in the group (Giraldeau and Caraco 2000). This results in frequency-dependent success of the scrounging strategy: at low frequency, scroungers’ payoff is high, but if all individuals in a group are scroungers, their payoff is zero

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