Abstract
There is the intuition that some emotions do not sustain a cognitively demanding reading of their representational content. However, it is not evident how to articulate that intuition—and the mere claim that the content of those emotions is not conceptual (or, alternatively, that it is non-conceptual; see, for instance, Tappolet, 2016) does not shed light on the specific way in which those emotions represent. We, therefore, develop a proposal with the aim of giving substance to the claim that emotions involve non-conceptual mental content. The thesis that we defend entails that certain emotions are intrinsically motivational, specifically that their content is action-oriented and presents the world in terms of intrinsically motivational possibilities for action. Then we delve into the way this thesis stands in regard to views according to which the essence of emotions lies in the attitude rather than in the content (Deonna & Teroni, 2012, 2015), or others in which emotions have to do with action-readiness rather than with action itself (Scarantino, 2014)—as well as in regard to doubts on the very notion of non-conceptual content. Finally, we examine some consequences deriving from the proposal (having to do with the so-called irrationality of some emotions and the notion of basic emotion, among others) and its position relative to notable approaches to emotion (cognitive, perceptual, attitudinal and motivational).
Highlights
When we are afraid, disgusted or in anger, we are afraid of a barking dog, disgusted by rotten food, angry with a despotic boss
We delve into the way this thesis stands in regard to views according to which the essence of emotions lies in the attitude rather than in the content (Deonna & Teroni, 2012, 2015), or others in which emotions have to do with action-readiness rather than with action itself (Scarantino, 2014)—as well as in regard to doubts on the very notion of non-conceptual content
We look at some consequences of the view we propose: in regard to the motivational and phenomenal dimensions of emotions and concerning the relation primitive emotions would have to other mental states, as well as regarding recalcitrance and the notion of basic emotions
Summary
When we are afraid, disgusted or in anger, we are afraid of a barking dog, disgusted by rotten food, angry with a despotic boss. Theorists as Clark (1997) and Wheeler (2005) have developed approaches seeking to explain the fluid, flexible, real-time, and context-sensitive adaptive responses that are often labelled “online cognition” They posit the existence of a specific kind of representation involved in online cognition, in which it is more likely that the environmental items are presented in terms of possibilities for action in a particular context—they call them ‘action-oriented representation’ or AOR Despite claims that there cannot be mental content without concepts and presentations of the world in terms of objects and properties, it seems that the environment may be nonconceptually available to a subject as possibilities for action that are intrinsically motivational, as in the content of AORs6. One can experience the urge to ward off from something without grasping it as a reidentifiable particular or objective property —it is enough to grasp its relational, contextual aspects to experience it as dangerous
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary 
Published Version (
Free)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
