An Approach to Modeling Cognitive Antagonism With Incomplete Information

Abstract

The cognitive antagonism is one of the core aspects in electromagnetic spectrum warfare. Since it is impossible for the opposing parties to perceive the state information of each other completely, the existing evaluation methods are inappropriate for evaluating the cognitive antagonistic effectiveness. For solving this problem, a Stackelberg game-based method of modeling the cognitive antagonism with incomplete information is proposed in this article, i.e., depending on the domain knowledge and public information, we first tease out the antijamming measures of radars and then propose the empirical formulas of antijamming improve factors accordingly. Similarly, the method to calculate the jamming payoff is proposed for the power suppression and spoofing patterns of jammers. Furthermore, the method of constructing the strategy matrices for bimatrix Stackelberg game is presented. By taking the probability of radar recognizing false targets as uncertain information, we test the effect of game in a specified antagonistic environment and draw out some useful conclusions from the testing results.