Abstract
AbstractWe apply simple games with alternatives to describe voting mechanisms used in parliamentary organizations. As a matter of example, we analyze the Catalonia Parliament. Special attention is paid to abstention, which is allowed in most voting rules but is not taken into account when a voting rule is modelled as a simple classical game. To measure the power of each voter in each game, the extended Shapley–Shubik index is considered. (© 2008 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)
Published Version (
Free)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
