Abstract
:New cap-and-trade (CT) programs (e.g., Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative) to mitigate climate change have created the need for decision support in investment, bidding, and oversight in electricity markets. This need is critical for practicing engineering managers in restructured electricity markets operating under market-based competition. In this research we develop a bi-level game-theoretic model to obtain optimal bidding strategies for power generating companies in restructured markets under a CT program. We demonstrate the applicability of our model on data from Northern Illinois electricity market and discuss managerial implications. Detailed sensitivity analyses show how CT programs can impact electricity and allowance prices.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
