Abstract
According to naturalized metaphysics, metaphysics should be informed by our current best science and not rely on a priori reasoning. Consequently, naturalized metaphysics tends to dismiss metaphysicians’ attempts to quarrel with science. This paper argues that naturalized metaphysics should instead welcome such conflicts between metaphysics and science. Naturalized metaphysics is not (and should not be) eliminative of metaphysics. So, if such conflicts are driven by the immediate absence in science of an answer to a metaphysical question, then the conflict should not be dismissed, but instead be received as an occasion to do (more) naturalized metaphysics. That conflicts between metaphysics and science might be beneficial for naturalized metaphysics is exemplified by the case of non-spatial theories of quantum gravity. These theories are criticized by metaphysicians who, often following David Lewis, argue that spatial distance is an indispensable fundamental element in any coherent metaphysics due to its role as the world-making relation. The resulting conflict, however, is found to be well-motivated since the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity offer no alternative world-making relation to spatial distance. Rather than dismissing this conflict, naturalized metaphysics should therefore receive the Lewisians’ resistance as a call to search for one. How this plays out as a negotiation between the scientific theory and the metaphysical question is exemplified in the last part of the paper where entanglement is proposed as an alternative world-making relation in loop quantum gravity.
Highlights
While there is no univocal definition of metaphysics, it is often characterized as the “systematic study of the most fundamental structure of reality” (Lowe, 1998, 2), as “the study of ultimate reality” (van Inwagen, 2015, 1), or as “the exploration of the most general features of the world” (Blackburn, 2002, 61, emphasis in original).1 This characterization, might just as well be given of fundamental physics, at least adopting a realist voice
3 Naturalized metaphysics and metaphysical questions. Naturalized metaphysics features both a destructive and constructive component: The destructive component criticizes the traditional methods of metaphysics – intuitions, common sense, conceptual analysis, and a priori reasoning – while the constructive component proposes that metaphysics should instead be based on the findings of our current best sciences: “Naturalism requires that, since scientific institutions are the instruments by which we investigate objective reality, their outputs should motivate all claims about this reality, including metaphysical ones” (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, 30)
In connection with the latter, two warnings are in place: (1) Even though entanglement is offered as an answer to a metaphysical question, this answer originates in the serious engagement with a physical theory and for this reason, entanglement does not carry any significance beyond its role in gluing polyhedra in loop quantum gravity
Summary
While there is no univocal definition of metaphysics, it is often characterized as the “systematic study of the most fundamental structure of reality” (Lowe, 1998, 2), as “the study of ultimate reality” (van Inwagen, 2015, 1), or as “the exploration of the most general features of the world” (Blackburn, 2002, 61, emphasis in original). This characterization, might just as well be given of fundamental physics, at least adopting a realist voice. The received view, in other words, seems to be that science takes priority over metaphysical theorizing in cases of direct conflict This promises to quickly resolve the conflict between Lewisians and the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity: Considering that their resistance – like Parmenides’ – appears to be at least partly based on a priori reasoning, the Lewisians should yield and give up the fundamentality of spatial distance.. This promises to quickly resolve the conflict between Lewisians and the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity: Considering that their resistance – like Parmenides’ – appears to be at least partly based on a priori reasoning, the Lewisians should yield and give up the fundamentality of spatial distance.5 For naturalized metaphysics, this conflict is another illustration that science-independent metaphysics is futile and harmful, if it aims to compete with science
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