An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules

Abstract

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) requires transferring student-athletes to complete one full year of academic residence at their transfer schools before becoming eligible to play sports for the transfer schools.' The transfer rules apply in their most stringent form to student-athletes in revenue sports: men's basketball, football, and ice hockey. Thus, if a college football player were to begin his career at Florida State University and then transfer to the University of Illinois, he would be unable to play for one season and might not be able to receive institutional financial aid. The transfer rules place unique limitations on student-athletes, as college students not participating in athletics can transfer freely from college to college, and professional athletes can transfer freely from team to team. In this Comment, I argue that the NCAA transfer rules violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which makes illegal every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States. Part I of this Comment provides history and background information about the NCAA and the transfer rules. Part II then sets out the relevant antitrust law, including the applicability of antitrust law to the NCAA, courts' inconclusive application of antitrust law to the transfer rules, and courts' antitrust analysis of similar regulations in professional sports. In Part III, I argue that the NCAA transfer rules violate the Sherman Act. The argument is structured as follows: first, the NCAA transfer rules are sufficiently commercial to warrant antitrust scrutiny; second, the rules have a significant anticompetitive effect on the national market for student-athletes' services; and third, the regulations fail an antitrust analysis because (1) any procompetitive rationales that could be offered to justify the rule are insufficient to overcome the anticompetitive effects and (2) less restrictive alternatives could achieve the same procompetitive aims.