Abstract
We consider a multi-access channel problem, where several selfish users communicate with a base station (BS) in the presence of a jammer. The jammer wishes to degrade the communication by producing interference. The communication metric is the inverse signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), which, for low SINR, reflects communication delay. The problem is formulated in Nash and Stackelberg game frameworks. The equilibrium is derived in closed form for both models. The usability of the latency metric even in the presence of a jammer is proven by showing that the equilibrium is unique.
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