An anonymous two-factor authenticated key agreement scheme for session initiation protocol using elliptic curve cryptography

Abstract

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a signaling protocol widely applied in the world of multimedia communication. Numerous SIP authenticated key agreement schemes have been proposed with the purpose of ensuring security communication. Farash recently put forward an enhancement employing smart cards counted on Zhang et al.'s scheme. In this study, we observe that the enhanced scheme presented by Farash has also some security pitfalls, such as disclosure of user identity, lack of a pre-authentication in the smart card and vulnerability to key-compromise masquerading attack which results in an off-line guessing attack. We then propose an anonymous modified scheme with elliptic curve cryptography to eliminate the security leakages of the scheme proposed by Farash. We demonstrate that our scheme is immune to different kinds of attacks including attacks involved in Farash's scheme. We mention Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic for completeness of the proposed scheme. Also, we compare the performance of our scheme with its predecessor schemes and the comparative results shows that it perfectly satisfies the needs of SIP.