Abstract
AbstractIn this paper the workings of the generic version of the poison pill are investigated. The analysis shows that the poison pill with only a flip‐over provision is ineffective as either an anti‐merger mechanism or an anti‐takeover device. Two antidotes to the flip‐over provision (one of which is well known) are provided here. The analysis further demonstrates that with the inclusion of a flip‐in provision it is possible for the target firm to construct a poison pill right to either increase the tender price and allow the takeover or to eliminate the possibility of a successful hostile tender offer.
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