Abstract
Most national and international observers perceive recent political developments in Burundi (Nkurunziza’s third term as head of state, constitutional reforms in 2018, presidential elections process in 2020) as a violation of the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in 2000, which was the cornerstone of the Burundian peace process. This article discusses the normative approach often adopted to evaluate the success or failure of the Arusha Agreement through an analysis of the variance between stipulations of the agreement and the reality on the ground. By mobilising intermedial interpretations of peace success, we proffer that the Arusha Agreement should be seen as a key moment in a dynamic process marked by power relations. Using a case of returnee land rights, we show that in actuality, the provisions of the Arusha Agreement were never fully implemented; revealing the real element that shaped the domain of returnee land in Burundi: power relations that express actors’ interests.
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