An analysis on the EU's FTA strategy by framework of three-level games theory - Focus on the Korea-EU FTA, EU-ASEAN FTA and EU-Japan EPA -

Abstract

This paper applied the existing two-level game theory and introduced a three-level game theory in order to analyze the FTA negotiation strategy of the EU. This paper hypothesized the characteristics as follows when a regional cooperative union receives exclusive rights to common commercial policy and enters into commercial agreements such as FTAs and extracted propositions.<BR> In conclusion, a regional union which adopts a common commercial policy orients itself toward market liberalization and openness as pursued by multilateralism such as the WTO and induces FTA negotiations in the same way. This verifies well that multilateralism and regionalism which seems to carry out exclusive objectives in the short run works toward one positive goal, which is outlined in GATT Article 24 of allowing territorial application, customs union and free-trade areas. Therefore, the development direction of multilateralism, regionalism, and bilateralism may be found using the analysis in this paper as a foundation. Furthermore, it may be estimated that this may serve as a theoretical foundation for finding an appropriate response strategy by gauging beforehand the FTA negotiation strategies of advanced regional unions.