An Analysis on Optimal Attack Schedule Based on Channel Hopping Scheme in Cyber-Physical Systems.

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the issue of security on the remote state estimation in cyber-physical systems (CPSs), where a wireless sensor utilizes the channel hopping scheme to transmit the data to the remote estimator over multiple channels in the presence of periodic denial-of-service attacks. Assume that the jammer can interfere with a subset of channels at each attack time in active period. For an energy-constraint jammer, the problem of how to select the number of channels at each attack time to maximally deteriorate the CPS performance is investigated. Based on the index of average estimation error, we introduce two different attack strategies, which include selecting identical number of channels and unequal number of channels at each attack time, and further show theoretically that the attack effect by selecting unequal number of channels is better than that of selecting identical number of channels. By formulating the problem of selecting the number of channels as integer programming problems, we present the corresponding algorithm to approximate the optimal attack schedule for both cases. The numerical results are presented to validate the theoretical results and the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.