Abstract

The issue of tenure among political executives has been hypothesized to be important in understanding the ability of presidents to implement policy. While it has been demonstrated that these executives remain in their appointed position for a very short period of time and theories have been developed to explain this short tenure, previous work has not tested these hypotheses statistically. This article uses data from a 1985 National Academy of Public Administration survey of political appointees and, using multiple regression methods, addresses the specific factors that have been theorized to influence the tenure of these executives. Specifically, two key factors are found to negatively impact tenure: poor relations with the career bureaucracy and the lure of greater private sector salaries. Other hypotheses are tested as well. The results provide a clearer picture of the motivations of these officials and may be of assistance in promoting an increased length of service through better recruitment and retention methods.

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