Abstract
This paper examines whether the financial performance of the firm is associated with the risk‐taking propensity of executives, which is inferred from the structure of their share option portfolio. The objective of this paper is to determine if executives have greater risk bearing preferences when they have more share options than shares in their firm. In turn, executives' risk‐taking preferences suggest that these decision‐makers adopt value‐increasing strategies. The results of this study support this notion. The results of the study of 182 Australian firms demonstrate that the negative relationship between firm risk and firm performance is weaker when executives hold a higher proportion of share options than shares in their investment in the firm. These results hold implications for executives' compensation contracts. That is, executives who share in their firms' risk via share options are more likely to undertake risky activities with high‐expected performance outcome.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
