Abstract
Abstract The author attempts to offer an analytic statement of the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of a truthful application of the functor ‘ a promised b that …’. According to this analysis, promising is saying c with an eye to the addressee's realizing or thinking (i) of the speaker's intention to act towards the state of affairs d about which the speaker knows or thinks that it is not the case that the hearer suspects the speaker's ignorance about his dissatisfaction should d fail to materialize, (ii) of the speaker's belief that the hearer could approach him as obliged to act towards d , (iii) of the speaker's placing himself under an obligation to act towards d (a simplified account). Particular points of the definition are discussed and justified. Special attention is paid to the notion of obligation. A critical comparison of the definition with Searle's concept of promise is made. The author concludes with remarks on the relationship between promise and morality and on the relationship between descriptive and evaluative statements.
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