Abstract
A model of interlinked credit-product contracts between small farmers and large farmers when the small farmer faces delay in getting formal credit and the large farmer does not, has been developed. The small farmer remains on the reservation income level, and his reservation income is inversely related to the length of the delay. However, this does not hamper the productivity of the small farmer. The large farmer extracts the surplus through the interlinked contract and this surplus is positively related to the length of the delay. Interlinkage and non-inter-linkage equilibria become identical if the small farmer gets the formal credit at the beginning of the crop cycle. Various subsidy policies worsen the distribution of formal credit.
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More From: The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
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