Abstract
This article presents an analysis of common sales agents based on their precommitment role when sellers are better informed about the products than potential buyers. The author shows that an exclusive channel can create a cost, owing to the inability of exclusive sellers to commit themselves to sales impartiality. Independent noncooperative firms may use common agents as a precommitment to sales impartiality. The author demonstrates that common sales agency can arise as an equilibrium outcome in the absen ce of cost savings, marketing advantages, or the Bernheim-Whinston collusion effect. The analysis shows that common agency of this type can be welfare improving.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
