Abstract

AbstractThis paper offers an account of propositional absurdity and investigates its connection to falsity. I propose that instances of absurdity just are cases of what I call maximal abnormality. In light of the works of Smith (2016) and Pietroski and Rey (1995) on normic conditionals which link normality to explanatory demands, I suggest that absurdity also has a close tie with explanations (more precisely, the lacking thereof). Interesting consequences follow under such an account – first, I argue that we should see absurdity as ceteris paribus guide to falsehood – what is absurd is expected to be false, unless further evidence suggests otherwise; second (and relatedly), when further evidence indeed suggests otherwise, absurd propositions would not cease to be absurd.

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