An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The Case of State Public Utility Commissions

Abstract

This article presents a of regulation based on the assessment of the objectives of regulatory commission personnel and the resources at their disposal. The generates several interrelated hypotheses, which are tested using comparative empirical analysis of the factors determining state regulatory commission policy concerning electric rates. The results prove consistent with recent studies challenging key assumptions of the once-dominant of regulation. An explanation of the policies of state regulatory commissions is found to require consideration of two objectives of commissioners: (1) implementing the dominant nonpecuniary guide for policy choice among regulatory officials: the principle that the major determinant of regulated utility rates should be the cost of providing service; and (2) the goal of survival, i.e., remaining in office and maintaining sufficient order and political support to function effectively in the regulatory process. But the analysis suggests that commission professionalism and information are important resources, the levels of which affect the ability of regulatory personnel to achieve these objectives. Furthermore, there is evidence that the presence at regulatory proceedings of an intervenor representing the interests of consumers and the extent to which these proceedings are open to the public influence regulatory policy by affecting the incentives of commission personnel and widening the information resources at a commission's disposal. Recently, a growing body of literature has emerged which challenges the once-dominant capture theory of regulation. This was developed primarily through a set of case studies which found that regulated groups were able to control or the agencies which regulate them, thereby insuring that regulatory decisions will be uniformly consistent with the interests of the regu