An alternative norm of intention consistency.

Carlos Núñez

doi:10.1002/tht3.453

Abstract

In this paper, I formulate a norm of intention consistency that is immune to the kind of cases that have been put forth to argue either that rationality does not require consistency between an agent's intentions, or that, if it does, then rationality is not normative. The norm I formulate mimics refinements that have been made to the norm of means‐end coherence in response to cases where, intuitively, you need not be irrational when you intend an end e, despite not intending the means m you believe to be necessary for e, because you do not believe that intending m is necessary for e. Similarly, according to the norm I put forth, if you intend e, and believe that e is inconsistent with e*, you need not be irrational if you also intend e*, as long as you do not believe that intending e* is inconsistent with e.

Highlights

In this situation, it isn't irrational for you to intend to hit T1 and intend to hit T2, despite your belief that these ends are inconsistent.4 This has led them to think that, either rationality does not require (believed) consistency between an agent's intentions, or, if it does, rationality is not normative.5
I will formulate a norm of intention consistency that could be accepted by those who are convinced by such arguments, and so who think that, in cases like these, it need not be irrational to intend each of two acknowledgedly inconsistent ends
As far as I know, all cases that have been presented as intuition pumps against a norm of intention consistency are ones where, by pursuing each of two acknowledgedly inconsistent ends, an agent can augment her chances of getting what she wants

Summary

Introduction

In this situation, it isn't irrational for you to intend to hit T1 and intend to hit T2, despite your belief that these ends are inconsistent.4 This has led them to think that, either rationality does not require (believed) consistency between an agent's intentions, or, if it does, rationality is not normative.5 I will formulate a norm of intention consistency that could be accepted by those who are convinced by such arguments, and so who think that, in cases like these, it need not be irrational to intend each of two acknowledgedly inconsistent ends.

Results

Conclusion