Abstract
An important element of social choice theory are impossibility theorems, such as Arrow's theorem and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem, which state that under certain natural constraints, social choice mechanisms are impossible to construct. In recent years, beginning in Kalai'01, much work has been done in finding \text it{robust} versions of these theorems, showing that impossibility remains even when the constraints are \text it{almost} always satisfied. In this work we present an Algebraic scheme for producing such results. We demonstrate it for a variant of Arrow's theorem, found in Dokow and Holzman [5].
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
