Abstract

Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse e-marketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.

Highlights

  • 1.1 In the explosive growth of electronic commerce, electronic auctions have received a great deal of interest in recent years

  • 1.6 we propose an agent-based combinatorial auction market design methodology with a systematic framework on market architecture, auction rules, and winner determination

  • 4.1 we propose the system architecture for the combinatorial auction market design agent (CAMDA) based on intermediary, and illustrate the agent based design process using Forward and Backward Chain Reasoning for the simultaneous general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market

Read more

Summary

Introduction

1.1 In the explosive growth of electronic commerce, electronic auctions have received a great deal of interest in recent years. Market Architecture Type VI , newly-suggested in our study, is a buyers' driven reverse n-bilateral combinatorial auction, in which multi-buyers participate as auctioneers and multi-sellers as bidders.

Results
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call