Abstract

This paper deals with the case of programming the development of future transportation systems by identifying inter-dependencies among competitors. Here, a market of maritime facilities is modelled as an n -person non-cooperative game among port authorities that promote the attractiveness of their terminal facilities, in terms of level of service provided. At the same time, freight shippers/carriers who are forming their service network based on the prevailing conditions offered by the available transportation paths are also modelled in the context of a non-cooperative game. Optimal decisions are obtained by extending the standard single leader–multiple followers Stackelberg game-theoretic formulation of the network design problem (NDP) to its complete form of multiple leaders–multiple followers competitive NDP. The estimation of the equilibrium point of the above complex transportation system is based on a novel evolutionary optimisation framework. Results from alternative design strategies are presented revealing the effects of competition and cooperation on systems design.

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