An Aesthetic Grounding for the Role of Concepts in Experience in Kant, Wittgenstein and Mcdowell

Tim Thornton

doi:10.35765/forphil.2007.1202.18

Abstract

The paper begins by asking, in the context of McDowell's Mind and World, what guides empirical judgement. It then critically examines David Bell's account of the role of aesthetic judgement, or experience, in Kant and Wittgenstein, in shedding light on empirical judgement. Bell's suggestion that a Wittgensteinian account of aesthetic experience can guide the application of empirical concepts is criticised: neither the discussion of aesthetic judgement nor aesthetic experience helps underpin empirical judgement. But attention to the parallel between Wittgenstein's discussion of understanding rules and the question of how empirical concepts can be applied to particulars suggests how to dissolve the felt need for an answer. This in turn helps shed light on McDowell's conceptualist account of experience.

Highlights

In Mind and World, John McDowell defends a broadly Kantian account of the harmony of thought and world in which experience plays a central role in removing 'transcendental anxiety' about intentionality
If the final step in giving a reason for an empirical judgement is an extra-conceptual act of pointing, it will not sustain a rational friction between belief and the world
Kant's account of aesthetic judgment highlights a harmony which occurs in reflective judgment generally and sheds light on empirical judgment by answering Q

Summary

Introduction

In Mind and World, John McDowell defends a broadly Kantian account of the harmony of thought and world in which experience plays a central role in removing 'transcendental anxiety' about intentionality. It must account for the nature or content of judgements and Bell suggests that this involves accounting for their subjectivity, objectivity, reflexivity and rationality It must meet a key formal constraint, the 'principle of spontaneity' : If the performance of an act of type ö is learned, or rule governed, it cannot be a general requirement of my performing an arbitrary act of type ö that I have already performed an act ofthat type... Kant's account of aesthetic judgment highlights a harmony which occurs in reflective judgment generally and sheds light on empirical judgment by answering Q. Bell suggests that Wittgenstein's account of aesthetic experience provides a further way to fill out Kant's account in such a way that it meets his general constraint: the principle of spontaneity. I will assess Bell's suggestion (which looks to aesthetic experience) and draw some lessons from it for a better understanding of Wittgenstein and McDowell

Is there a relation between aesthetic and empirical judgments in Wittgenstein?

Wittgenstein rules and Q