Abstract

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) can be quickly and randomly deployed in any harsh and unattended environment and only authorized users are allowed to access reliable sensor nodes in WSNs with the aid of gateways (GWNs). Secure authentication models among the users, the sensor nodes and GWN are important research issues for ensuring communication security and data privacy in WSNs. In 2013, Xue et al. proposed a temporal-credential-based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for WSNs. However, in this paper, we point out that Xue et al.'s scheme cannot resist stolen-verifier, insider, off-line password guessing, smart card lost problem and many logged-in users' attacks and these security weaknesses make the scheme inapplicable to practical WSN applications. To tackle these problems, we suggest a simple countermeasure to prevent proposed attacks while the other merits of Xue et al.'s authentication scheme are left unchanged.

Highlights

  • Wireless sensor networks are innovative ad hoc networks that include a large number of sensor nodes with resource-constrained characteristics such as limited power, communication and computational capabilities [1,2,3,4]

  • Entity authentication [7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16] plays an important role in Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and logging-in users and deployed sensors should be authenticated to be the admissible participants by the gateway node (GWN)

  • Das’ scheme has later attracted a lot of attention and several two-factor user authentication schemes with mutual authentication and key agreement have been proposed in Li et al [20], Yeh et al [21], Das et al [22], Li et al [23], and Xue et al [24]

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Summary

Introduction

Wireless sensor networks are innovative ad hoc networks that include a large number of sensor nodes with resource-constrained characteristics such as limited power, communication and computational capabilities [1,2,3,4]. There are a few works that detail a complete secure user authentication schemes for wireless sensor networks with all their different features. Das’ scheme has later attracted a lot of attention and several two-factor user authentication schemes with mutual authentication and key agreement have been proposed in Li et al [20], Yeh et al [21], Das et al [22], Li et al [23], and Xue et al [24]. In [24], Xue et al suggest a lightweight temporal-credential-based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme that provides more functionality features with higher security, and ensures low costs of computation, communication and storage

Our Contributions
Organization of the Paper
Registration Phase
Login Phase
Stolen Verifier and Insider Attack
Off-Line Password Guessing Attack
Lost Smart Card Problem
Many Logged-in Users’ Problem
Advanced Authentication Scheme
Pre-Registration Phase
Security Analysis on Our Advanced Authentication Scheme
Resistance to Stolen Verifier and Insider Attacks
Resistance to Off-Line Password Guessing Attacks
Resistance to Smart Card Lost Problem
Resistance to the Many Logged-in Users Problem
Comparisons of Related Schemes
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
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