Abstract

Android is a successful mobile platform with a thriving application ecosystem. However, despite its security precautions like permission mechanism, it is still vulnerable to privilege escalation threats and particularly confused deputy attacks that exploit the permission leak vulnerabilities of Android applications. Worse, most existing detection and protection techniques have become costly and unresponsive in current Android dynamic permission environments. In this paper, we propose a configurable Android security framework to prevent the exploitation of permission leak vulnerabilities of third-party applications via confused deputy attacks. Our framework collects the runtime states of applications and enforces policy and capability-based access control to restrain riskful inter-application communications, so as to provide more responsive, adaptive, and flexible application protection. Besides, our framework provides users with a flexible runtime policy configuration together with a complementary security mechanism to mitigate risks induced by inappropriate policies. Additionally, we present a sophisticated access decision cache system with a proactive maintenance method that ensures the efficiency and dependability of decision services. Theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation demonstrate that our approach provides configurable and effective protections for third-party applications against permission leak vulnerabilities at small performance and usability costs.

Full Text
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