Abstract

As a new type of service computing model, cloud computing provides various services through the Internet. Virtual machine (VM) hopping is a security issue often encountered in the virtualization layer. Once it occurs, it directly affects the reliability of the entire computing platform. Therefore, we have thoroughly studied the virtual machine hopping attack. In addition, we designed the access control model PVMH (Prevent VM hopping) to prevent VM hopping attacks based on the BLP model and the Biba model. Finally, we implemented the model on the Xen platform. The experiments demonstrate that our PVMH module succeeds in preventing VM hopping attack with acceptable loss to virtual machine performance.

Highlights

  • Cloud computing is an Internet-based, emerging network computing model

  • We study the related content of virtual machine hopping attacks

  • Mohammad-Mahdi et al [18] presented an approach to efficiently detect side-channel attacks based on cross-virtual machine (VM) cache, using hardware fine-grained information provided by Intel Cache Monitoring Technology (CMT) and Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs)

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Summary

Introduction

Cloud computing is an Internet-based, emerging network computing model. It is another new computing concept after parallel computing, grid computing, and utility computing [1]. Jason Geffner of CrowdStrike found a security vulnerability related to the virtual floppy controller in the open source computer emulator QEMU, codenamed “VENOM” (CVE-2015-3456). It existed in many computer virtualization platforms (notably Xen, KVM, VirtualBox, and the native QEMU client). An attacker can use it to access the host system and all virtual machines running on the host, and can elevate access permissions so that attackers can access the host's local network and neighboring systems Another vulnerability (CVE-2018-10853) indicated that KVM 4.10 and later versions in the Linux kernel have security flaws in implementation due to the failure to detect the CPL (the privilege level of the currently executing task or program).

Related Works
VM Hopping Analysis
VM Hopping Hazard
VM Hopping Defense
Access Control
BLP Model
Biba Model
Methods
PVMH Model Design
Model Elements
Object
Access Matrix M
Subject–object Security Label
Security Axioms
State Transition Rules
Subject–Object Mapping
Access Attribute Mapping
Access Matrix Mapping
Current Access Set
Security Level
Access Decision Module
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Basic Environment
Findings
The Initialization of PVMH Module
Full Text
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