Amicable Settlements in Investor-State Disputes: Empirical Analysis of Patterns and Perceived Problems

Abstract

This article empirically analyses investor-state arbitration cases that settle amicably after the arbitration has commenced but before the final award is rendered. The study investigates whether and to what extent some common criticisms of amicable settlements are evident in practice. It examines four research questions that correspond with the major critiques of amicable settlements in investor-state dispute settlement: (1) Is the amicable dispute settlement mechanism unsuitable for certain types of investor-state disputes? (2) Do amicable settlements impede transparency? (3) Does amicable settlement pay less compared to when the investor wins through an award? (4) Is the non-enforceability of settlement agreements a problem in practice? The findings suggest that not all these purported problematic aspects of amicable dispute settlement mechanisms are as evident in practice as is commonly believed.