Ambivalence, Well-Being, and Prudential Rationality

Abstract

Harry Frankfurt argues that ambivalence is hazardous if not harmful and that wholeheartedness is prudentially best. Susan Wolf, Amélie Rorty, David Velleman and others reply that wholeheartedness involves harmful close-mindedness and self-deception. This paper attempts to understand the impact of ambivalence on personal well-being using two related forms of the values-realization theory. It distinguishes several forms of ambivalence: evaluative indifference, value-incomparability, evaluative vacillation, evaluative conflict, and value-incompatibility. Evaluative conflict and value-incompatibility can lead to indecision and call out for resolution through higher-order attitudes. On an atomistic version of the values-realization theory, these forms of ambivalence are intrinsically neutral but often instrumentally harmful. However, on a holistic version of the values-realization theory, things are more complicated: rationally appropriate ambivalence is intrinsically beneficial because of its connection with agential functioning. But it may give rise to contradictory intentions, which are intrinsically harmful. In some cases, its instrumental costs are also considerable.