Abstract
AbstractThis article gives an explanation of how recent results on ambiguity logics are relevant to the linguistic and philosophical theory of ambiguity. To this aim, some fundamental definitions and results are explained. We formulate and provide evidence for three main hypotheses: Firstly, ambiguity is not a vague notion. Secondly, in (explicit) reasoning with ambiguity, we always have to consider the parameter trust. Thirdly, ambiguous propositions exist, but they cannot have the same rights and properties as unambiguous propositions; rather they should be considered “second class”.
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