Altruistic mode selection and coordination in a low-carbon closed-loop supply chain under the government's compound subsidy: A differential game analysis

Abstract

Under low-carbon circular economy, how the government and low-carbon closed-loop supply chain (LC-CLSC) members make decisions to achieve carbon neutrality and recycling of waste resources becomes a prominent part of the study. This paper studies the altruistic mode selection and coordination of the LC-CLSC under the compound subsidy of the government from a long-term dynamic perspective. The results show that the altruistic behavior of the manufacturer as the leading party can promote emission reduction and recycling activities, and increase the retailer's profit and total profit while avoiding damage to its profit when its altruistic intensity is maintained at a reasonable level. The altruistic behavior of the retailer as the subordinate party will inhibit emission reduction and recycling activities, and increase the manufacturer's profit by damaging its profit, therefore leading to a decline in the total profit. The emission reduction subsidy rate decreases as the mutual altruistic intensity increases. The recycling subsidy rate decreases as the manufacturer's altruistic intensity increases, but it will increase as the retailer's altruistic intensity increases. Compared with other altruistic modes, the leading party manufacturer's unilateral altruistic mode can achieve a higher level of emission reduction, recycling rate, total profit, consumer surplus and social welfare.