Altruism, Selfishness and So Much In-Between

Abstract

The theory of inclusive fitness — that natural selection can favor altruistic behavior directed at relatives — has dominated the landscape on the subject of social behavior since it was devised by W. D. Hamilton (1964). But a controversy is now brewing over the scope and merit of this theory in relation to its intended applications, urging a reconsideration of the role of groups in evolution (Nowak, et al 2010). One conciliatory voice urges that: “kin and multi-level selection are not alternative theories; they simply offer different takes on the question of how social behaviour evolved… These explanations may seem different, but mathematical models show that they are in fact equivalent” (Okasha 2010). This paper argues that the reconciliation project is misguided: the competing theoretical models on which they are based (and the corresponding game-theoretical models) are incompatible, however much their predictions on a handful of cases might converge. As will be clarified here, inclusive fitness models are premised fatally upon a flawed two-part distinction between altruism and selfishness. The philosophical analysis here will show that behavior that fails to qualify as altruism may also fail to qualify as selfishness. This insight requires a move to a tripartite distinction, which takes seriously the middle space between selfishness and altruism — the space where consideration of the role of groups belongs. The tripartite distinction is as important to biology as to the human sciences of psychology, economics and political science, because it can help resolve long-standing problems with handling the major transitions in evolution as well as the role of niche construction in evolutionary explanations. In this paper, a suite of philosophical distinctions are developed and organized for use by a range of scientific disciplines.