Abstract

We study the evolution of cooperation as a birth-death process in spatially extended populations. The benefit from the altruistic behavior of a cooperator is implemented by decreasing the death rate of its direct neighbors. The cost of cooperation is the increase of a cooperator's death rate proportional to the number of its neighbors. When cooperation has higher cost than benefit, cooperators disappear. Then the dynamics reduces to the contact process with defectors as the single particle type. Increasing the benefit-cost ratio above 1, the extinction transition of the contact process splits into a set of nonequilibrium transitions between four regimes when increasing the baseline death rate $p$ as a control parameter: (i) defection only, (ii) coexistence, (iii) cooperation only, (iv) extinction. We investigate the transitions between these regimes. As the main result, we find that full cooperation is established at the extinction transition as long as benefit is strictly larger than cost. Qualitatively identical phase diagrams are obtained for populations on square lattices and in pair approximation. Spatial correlations with nearest neighbors only are thus sufficient for sustained cooperation.

Highlights

  • Altruism or cooperativity [1] describe behavior that is more in favor of others than of the actor herself

  • The question of sustained altruism and cooperativity has been addressed in the framework of evolutionary game theory, in particular by work on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Public Goods Games [5,6]

  • General considerations about the prevalence of altruism in the context of the Public Goods Games can be inferred from the numerous studies on the topic [51,52], the behavior of cooperation turns out to be very dependent on the specific dynamics considered [53,54]

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Altruism or cooperativity [1] describe behavior that is more in favor of others than of the actor herself. General considerations about the prevalence of altruism in the context of the Public Goods Games can be inferred from the numerous studies on the topic [51,52], the behavior of cooperation turns out to be very dependent on the specific dynamics considered [53,54] This is the case when trying to evaluate the importance of the spatial heterogeneity and the formation of clusters of cooperators: Many studies [14,16,18,55,56] explain the coexistence of cooperation and defection using the so-called pair approximation, an approach that goes one step beyond mean field by tracking the dynamics of pairs of neighbors.

DEFINITION OF THE MODEL
SIMULATIONS
Square lattice with homogeneous parameters
Spatially dependent parameter p
ANALYTIC APPROXIMATIONS
Exact relations
Global mean-field approximation
Local mean-field approximation
Pair approximation
Steady-state solutions
Stability of the steady-state solutions
DISCUSSION
Full Text
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