Allocation Problems, by the Method of Alternative Representation of the Inverse Set, for Values of Cooperative TU Games

Abstract

In earlier works, we introduced the Inverse Problem, relative to the Shapley Value, as follows: for a given n-dimensional vector L, find out the transferable utilities’ games , such that The same problem has been discussed further for Semivalues. A connected problem has been considered more recently: find out TU-games for which the Shapley Value equals L, and this value is coalitional rational, that is belongs to the Core of the game . Then, the same problem was discussed for other two linear values: the Egalitarian Allocation and the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution, even though these are not Semivalues. To solve such problems, we tried to find a solution in the family of so called Almost Null Games of the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value, by imposing to games in the family, the coalitional rationality conditions.
 In the present paper, we use the same idea, but a new tool, an Alternative Representation of Semivalues. To get such a representation, the definition of the Binomial Semivalues due to A. Puente was extended to all Semivalues. Then, we looked for a coalitional rational solution in the Family of Almost Null games of the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value.
 In each case, such games depend on a unique parameter, so that the coalitional rationality will be expressed by a simple inequality, determined by a number, the coalitional rationality threshold. The relationships between the three numbers corresponding to the above three efficient values have been found. Some numerical examples of the method are given.