Abstract

The donor community has responded to unexpected or transitory drops in domestic food production in many countries in Sub-Sabaran Africa. An empirical framework estimates and analyzes the correlation between this food aid and domestic production. Both emergency food aid and commercial imports are used to offset the effects of negative output shocks in Sub-Saharan African countries-the major recipients of global emergency food aid. On average every one-ton drop in cereal production is offset by the delivery of 0.8 tons of cereal and dairy products from abroad (over four years). Most food aid arrives within a year of a shock, and correlation of shocks over time along with the differences between crop years and calendar years may explain the link between aid and production. The economic and political considerations also determine the global response to the emergency food needs of countries in Africa. The international response is not contingent on the form of government or the level of political and human rights violations. Poorer countries and those with well-established nonemergency food aid programs receive larger amounts of emergency aid when needed. Food aid has long helped low-income countries to sustain domestic food supplies and cope with transitory food insecurity, and it has also been used to accelerate agricultural development and increase food production. But food aid has been heavily criticized in the past decade on several grounds. First, it has been charged that the international response to food crises is slow, meager, and inefficient. A related accusation suggests that countries granting emergency food aid disciriminate on the basis of the political and economic orientation of the recipient country. Second, food aid has been thought to discourage domestic food production, thus leading to long-term dependence on donors. Finally, it has

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