Abstract
This paper generalizes the results of Siegel (2009, 2010) to accommodate performance spillovers. More precisely, we show that, if for any player, spillover from other players' performance is independent of his own performance, and if the spillover enters any player's payoff in an additively separable form, then an all-pay contest with spillovers has a unique Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we construct the equilibrium payoffs and strategies.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
