Abstract
ABSTRACTThis paper presents evidence that effort varies according to players’ positions in the contract cycle using 2007 through 2011 data on Major League Baseball (MLB) non-pitchers eligible for free agency. While controlling for time-invariant player traits, fixed-effect regression modelling produces evidence that MLB players exhibit contract-year increases in adjusted on-base-plus-slugging percentage (OPS+) in the final years of contracts and declines in OPS+ in the initial years of long-term contracts. The estimated contract-year boost is driven disproportionately by the best offensive performances, while estimated shirking effects are concentrated among the weakest. The results are not driven by the hitting performance of defensive specialists, nor do the results change when the econometric model accounts for players who change teams. OPS+ offers advantages over some other offensive statistics (such as RBI) because it depends less on teammate performance and adjusts for differences among home ball parks and the American and National Leagues.
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