All Justification Dilemmas Denied

Abstract

An individual, S, is in an epistemic dilemma with regard to a proposition, P, when there is no epistemically justified attitude for S to take toward P. There are apparent examples of epistemic dilemmas. For instance, consider P1, a proposition that asserts to S1 that S1 does not believe P1. S1 sees that S1’s belief in P1 would make P1 untrue. S1 sees also that S1’s lack of belief in P1 would make P1 true. It is highly plausible that believing a proposition that one sees to be untrue is not epistemically justified. It is highly plausible that it is not epistemically justified to fail to believe a proposition that one sees to be true. Nevertheless, it is argued here that S1 is not in a genuine epistemic dilemma concerning P1. It will be argued that other apparent examples are not genuine either. A main theme will be to highlight some epistemic merits of withholding judgment.